Hysteresis effects of changing parameters of noncooperative games by Wolpert, David H. et al.
Hysteresis effects of changing parameters of noncooperative games
David H. Wolpert,1 Michael Harre´,2 Eckehard Olbrich,3 Nils Bertschinger,3 and Juergen Jost3, ∗
1NASA Ames Research Center, MailStop 269-1, Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000, david.h.wolpert@nasa.gov
2Centre for the Mind, The University of Sydney, Australia
3Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Inselstrasse 22, D-04103 Leipzig, Germany
(Dated: August 17, 2018)
We adapt the method used by Jaynes to derive the equilibria of statistical physics to instead derive equilibria
of bounded rational game theory. We analyze the dependence of these equilibria on the parameters of the
underlying game, focusing on hysteresis effects. In particular, we show that by gradually imposing individual-
specific tax rates on the players of the game, and then gradually removing those taxes, the players move from a
poor equilibrium to one that is better for all of them.
INTRODUCTION
The Maximum Entropy (Maxent) principle is an
information-theoretic formalization of Occam’s razor. It
says that if we are given the expectation values of some
functions of a system’s state, then we should predict that the
associated distribution is the one with minimal information
(i.e., maximal entropy) consistent with those expecta-
tions [1, 2]. Maxent provides a succinct way to derive much
of statistical physics [3, 4], e.g., the canonical ensemble.
Noncooperative game theory [5–8] is the foundation of con-
ventional economics. It uses provided utility functions of a set
of human “players” to predict how the players will model one
another. It then uses this to predict the players’ joint behavior.
Many recent applications of statistical physics to economics
analyze it at a coarse-grained level, bypassing its game-
theoretic foundation. Here we build on [9] and apply Maxent
to game theory, thereby introducing statistical physics tech-
niques into the foundation of economics.
In this application of Maxent, there is a separate expecta-
tion value for each player. In contrast, when applying Maxent
to derive the canonical ensemble, there is a single expecta-
tion value (of the system’s energy). Accordingly, rather than
the canonical ensemble’s single Boltzmann distribution, in-
volving a single Hamiltonian and a single “temperature”, we
derive a separate Boltzmann distribution for each player, in-
volving only that player’s utility function, and a “temperature”
unique to that player. The players’ Boltzmann distributions
are coupled, and the joint solution provides a bounded ratio-
nality version of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of game theory,
where each player’s inverse temperature quantifies their ratio-
nality.
We analyze the dependence of this modified NE on the
parameters of the underlying game, focusing on bifurcation
behavior and hysteresis effects. In particular, we show how
by gradually imposing taxes on the players, and then grad-
ually removing them, the joint behavior of the players can
be moved from a poor equilibrium to a Pareto-superior one.
(This can even be done if we require that the players agree to
each infinitesimal change in tax rates, since each such change
increases every player’s expected utility.) This is particularly
interesting given estimates that non-OECD countries could in-
crease their wealth by one third by moving from their current
equilibrium to a different one. Next we introduce three toy
models of how a society can modify tax rates: via “social-
ism”, a “market”, or “anarchy”. We then compare these three
models in terms of the associated discounted sum of total util-
ities along the path of tax rates.
BACKGROUND
Many different axiomatic arguments establish that the
amount of syntactic information in a distribution P(y) in-
creases as the Shannon entropy of that distribution, S (P) ≡
−∑y P(y)ln[P(y)] [1, 3, 4], decreases. This provides a way to
formalize “Occam’s razor”: given limited prior data concern-
ing P(y), predict P(y) is the distribution with minimal infor-
mation (maximum entropy) consistent with that data. This
formalization of Occam’s razor is called the maximum en-
tropy principle (Maxent). When the data concerning P(y) is
expectation values of functions under P, Maxent has proven
extremely accurate in domains ranging from signal processing
to supervised learning [2]. Jaynes used it to derive statistical
physics [3], e.g., having the data be the expected energy of a
system or its expected number of particles of various types.
A finite, strategic form noncooperative game consists of a
set of N players, where each player i has her own set of al-
lowed pure strategies Xi of size |Xi| < ∞. A mixed strat-
egy is a distribution qi(xi) over Xi. The joint distribution over
X ≡i Xi is q(x) = ∏i qi(xi), and is called a strategy profile.
Each player i has a utility function ui : X → R. So
given strategy profile q, the expected utility of player i is
E(ui) =
∑
x
∏
j q j(x j)ui(x) where q−i(x−i) ≡ ∏ j,i q j(x j). The
Nash equilibrium (NE) is the strategy profile defined by hav-
ing every player i set qi to maximizes i’s expected utility, i.e.,
∀i, qi = argmaxq′i
[∑
x q′i(xi)q−i(x−i)ui(x)
]
. In general, this set
of coupled equations has multiple solutions.
A well-recognized problem of using the NE to predict real-
world behavior is its assumption that every player chooses
their optimal mixed strategy, which is called full rationality.
This assumption is violated (often badly) in many experimen-
tal settings [10, 11]. Our modified NE derived using Maxent
accommodates such bounded rationality.
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2MAXENT AND QUANTAL RESPONSE EQUILIBRIA
To predict what q the players in a given N-player game
Γ will adopt, first pick one of the players, i. Consider a
counter-factual situation, where i has the same move space
and utility function as in Γ, but rather than have a set of
N − 1 other humans set the distribution over X−i, an inani-
mate stochastic system sets that distribution, to some q−i(x−i).
In general, due to her limited knowledge of q−i, limited com-
putational power, etc., i will choose a suboptimal qi, i.e.,
qi < argmaxpi [Epiq−i (ui)]. To quantify this bounded rationality,
in analogy to Jaynes’ derivation of the canonical ensemble,
constrain qi so that Eqi,q−i (ui) has some (nonmaximal) value
for the given q−i. Then Maxent says
qi(xi) ∝ exp [βiEq−i (ui | xi)]. (1)
where βi is the Lagrange parameter enforcing the constraint.
Note that as βi → ∞, i becomes increasingly rational, whereas
as βi → 0, she becomes increasingly irrational.
Next, recall that by the axioms of utility theory [12], all
that player i is concerned with in choosing her mixed strategy
is the resultant expected utility. Accordingly, we presume that
if the best i can do is choose a particular qi when q−i is set
by an inanimate system, she would also choose qi if she faces
that same distribution q−i when it is set by other humans.
Generalizing, Maxent says that Eq. 1 should hold simulate-
nously for all N players i, with player-specific Lagrange pa-
rameters. This gives a set of N coupled non-linear equations
for q. Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [13] guarantees that set
always has a solution, and in general it has more than one.1
This prediction for q is not based on a model of bounded
rational human behavior derived from experimental data. It
is based on desiderata concerning the prediction process, not
on a model of the system being predicted. Nonetheless, it
is intriguing to note that maximizing Shannon entropy has a
natural interpretation in terms of a common model of human
bounded rationality, involving the cost of computation. To see
this, recall that −S (qi) measures the amount of information in
the distribution qi. Say we equate the cost to i of computing qi
with this amount of information. Then under Maxent, player
i minimizes the cost of computing her mixed strategy, subject
to a constraint for the value of her expected utility that acts
as an “aspiration level” . Under this interpretation, βi quanti-
fies i’s cost of computing qi, in units of expected utility. Future
work involves incorporating experimental data concerning hu-
man behavior as additional constraints in the Maxent. (Other
models of the cost of computation can be found in [14–18].)
Solutions to our N coupled equations for q are typically
called “logit Quantal Response Equilibria” (QRE) in game
1 An alternative Maxent approach would use it to set the entire joint distribu-
tion q(x) =
∏
i qi(xi) at once, rather than use it to set each qi separately and
then impose self-consistency. However there are difficulties in choosing
what constraints to use under this approach. See [9].
 
FIG. 1. E(ucol) vs. ~β under the QRE of the game in Eq. 3. The
hysteresis path involving bonds discussed in the text is highlighted.
theory [19–22]. They have been independently suggested sev-
eral times as a way to model human players [14, 23–27]. In all
this earlier work the logit distribution is not derived from first
principles.2 Nor is it related to information theory, or the cost
of computation. Rather typically the logit QRE has been used
as an ad hoc, few-degree of freedom model of bounded ratio-
nal play. As such it has been widely and successfully used to
fit experimental data concerning human behavior.3
THE SHAPE OF THE QRE SURFACE
To analyze the QRE surface of Eq. 1, we express it as
a set of functional relationships, qi = fi(q−i, βi), q−i =
f−i(qi, β−i). A bifurcation may occur if for some i
∂ fi
∂q−i
∂ f−i
∂qi
∂qi
∂βi
+
∂ fi
∂βi
− ∂qi
∂βi
= 0 (2)
cannot be solved for ∂qi
∂βi
, i.e., if det( ∂ fi
∂q−i
∂ f−i
∂qi
− Id) = 0. To illus-
trate this and related phenomena, we consider games between
a Row and Column player, each with two pure strategies. The
first is the famous “battle of the sexes” coordination game [5],
where the utility functions are
2|1 0|0
0|0 1|2 (3)
where the first (second) entry in each cell is the Row (Col-
umn) player’s utility for the associated pure strategy profile.
Each joint inverse temperature ~β ≡ (βrow, βcolumn) fixes QRE
q’s for this game, and therefore QRE expected utilities. Fig. 1
plots this surface taking ~β to Eq(ucol). At bifurcations the num-
ber of QRE solutions changes between one and three, and in-
finitesimal changes in ~β may result in discontinuous changes
2 The QRE literature justifies the logit distribution by appealing to choice
theory [28], where it arises if double-exponential noise is added to player
utility values. However that double-exponential noise assumption is never
axiomatically justified in choice theory; it is assumed for the calculational
convenience that it results in the logit distribution.
3 The logit distribution in Eq. 1 also arises in Reinforcement Learning [29–
32], as a way to design artificial agents that learn from experience.
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FIG. 2. The expected utility of the Row player along the path through
~β highlighted in Fig. 1, illustrated as a function of the Row player’s
rationality, βrow. The path starts at the bottom right, then travels left,
before turning and finishing at the top right. Even though the Row
player ultimately benefits if society follows this path, at the begin-
ning they lose expected utility. They may demand to be compensated
for that initial drop, e.g., with proceeds of a bond that are paid off by
both players when the end of the path is reached.
in expected utility. (E.g., this happens if the system starts at
~β = (5, 5) on the top surface, and then βrow is reduced to 0.)
An interesting effect occurs if we multiply the utilities by
−1. Fig. 3 illustrates part of the surface after this switch.
Note that on the bottom fold, for fixed βcol, decreasing βrow
increases E(urow). So Row benefits by being less rational, due
to how Column responds to Row’s drop in rationality.
By Eq. 1, changing βi affects the QRE q the same way as
keeping βi fixed but multiplying ui by some αi. So Fig.’s 1, 3
give QRE surfaces where ~β is fixed, but each ui is multiplied
by αi. (Formally, reinterpret the x and y axes as αrow and
αcol rescaled, and reinterpret the z axis as Eq(ui)/αi.) Note
we can interpret 1 − αi as a tax rate on player i. So if we
model rationalities βi as fixed, e.g., as behavioral attributes,
then on the bottom surface in Fig. 3, Row benefits if her tax
rate increases.
The fact that Row may prefer a higher tax rate suggests
that by varying tax rates “adiabatically” slowly, so that the
joint behavior of the players is always on the QRE surface,
we may be able to montonically improve expected utilities for
both players. Indeed, by changing tax rates we can gradually
move the equilibrium across the surface from one fold to the
other, and then undo those changes, returning the rates to their
original values, but leaving both players with higher expected
utility. (See [33] for other work that exploits the shape of a
QRE surface to optimize player joint behavior.)
More precisely, there are paths of ~β’s (i.e, of ~α’s) such that:
1. Neither player ever is more rational (taxed at a higher
rate) on the path than at the starting point.
2. At each step on the path, if after the next infinitesimal
change in ~β there is a QRE q infinitesimally close to the
current one, it is adopted. (Adiabaticity.)
3. Each infinitesimal change in ~β increases both Eq(ui)’s.
4. At each infinitesimal step, if multiple changes in q meet
(1)-(3), but one is Pareto superior to the others (i.e., bet-
ter for both players), the players coordinate on that one.
Examples of such paths are illustrated in Fig. 3.
The existence of such paths raises the question of how a
society should dynamically update its tax rates. We now com-
pare three procedures for how this could be done by society as
a whole. (For notational simplicity, and to emphasize the anal-
ogy with annealing, we parameterize the procedures in terms
of their action on ~β rather than on ~1 − ~α.)
I. “Anarchy”: Players independently decide how to mod-
ify their β’s. To do this they follow gradient ascent
with a small step size ∆, subject to the constraint that
no player i can go to a βi larger than the starting one.
Thus, both players i change βi by δβi ∈ [−∆,∆], us-
ing ∂E(ui)/∂βi to make their choice of what value δβi to
pick. (Since this is a linear procedure, the players will
always choose one of the three values {−∆, 0,∆}.)
II. “Socialism”: An external regulator determines the path,
again using gradient descent, this time over the sum of
the players’ expected utilities. At each step of the path
~β is changed by the (δβrow, δβcol) vector that maximizes
[δβrow
∂E(urow)
∂βrow
+δβcol
∂E(urow)
∂βcol
]+[δβrow
∂E(ucol)
∂βrow
+δβcol
∂E(ucol)
∂βcol
]
subject to ||(δβrow, δβcol)||2 ≤ 2∆2. (The constraint is to
match the step size to that of the first procedure.)
III. “Market”: Certain mild axioms concerning bargaining
behavior of humans give a unique prediction for what
bargain is reached in any bargaining scenario. Let T be
the set of joint expected utilities for all the bargains that
a set of N bargainers might reach in a particular bargain-
ing scenario. Then the “Nash bargaining concept” [6, 7]
predicts that the the joint expected utility of the bargain
reached is argmax~u∈T [
∏N
i=1 ui].
We can use the Nash bargaining concept to predict what
change to ~β the players would agree to under a “market”
where they bargain with one another to determine that
change. To do this we fix the set of all allowed bargains
to the set of all pairs ~β such that ||~β−~β(t)||2 ≤ 2∆2, where
~β(t) is the current joint β. We also choose ~d to be the
joint expected utility at ~β(t). So under Nash bargaining,
at each iteration t, the players choose the change in joint
β, δ~β, that maximizes the product[
E(uRow | ~β(t) + δ~β) − E(uRow | ~β(t))
]
×[
E(uCol | ~β(t) + δ~β) − E(uCol | ~β(t))
]
4FIG. 3. A QRE surface with paths shown for the anarchy (red), so-
cialism (blue) and market (purple) procedures. As in Fig. 1, the x and
y axes are player rationalities, βrow and βcol, and the z axis is expected
utility (this time of player Row).
subject to ||δ~β|| ≤ 2∆2. As in the other two procedures,
we use first order approximations in this one, to evaluate
the two differences in expected utilities.
In all three procedures the total change in ~β in any step never
exceeds
√
2∆. This adiabaticity reduces the computational
burden on the players, by not changing the game too much
from one timestep to the next. (Similar assumptions are called
comparitive statics in economics [34].)
As in standard economics, we can quantify how good a full
path produced by a procedure is for society as a whole by cal-
culating the discounted sum of future utilities along the path,
Q ≡
∑
t′>0
(1 + γ)t−t
′
N∑
i=1
E(ui(t′)) (4)
So we can compare the three procedures by calculating the
Q’s for the paths they generate starting from some shared ~β
at time t = 0. We did this for several representative initial
~β’s for the surface in Fig. 3. Anarchy always did worse than
the other two procedures. Those others are compared to each
other in Fig. 4. When the discounting factor γ is large (i.e.,
we are more concerned with near-term than long-term utility)
the market procedure does better, otherwise socialism does.
All three procedures are local, looking only a single step
into the future. A procedure that also considers the QRE sur-
face’s global geometry will produce better paths in general. In
particular, such global information allows us to consider paths
where a player loses expected utility for certain periods, but
in the end all players are better off. Fig. 1 highlights such a
path, along which player Column always benefits but player
Row loses initially, before ultimately benefitting. (A cross-
section of the expected utility of Row along the path is shown
in Fig. 2. ) Note that player Row might demand compensation
to agree to follow such a path where they temporarily lose ex-
pected utility,, e.g. in terms of a subsidy paid for with a bond
that is repaid by all players at the end of the path.
     
 
 
FIG. 4. The difference between the discounted sums of future ex-
pected utilities of the two players under the “socialism” and “market”
procedures, plotted against the discounting factor γ.
Particularly interesting issues arise when setting full paths
under the market model, if the players use discounted sum
of future utilities to value full paths. For example, say that
at t = 0 society starts to follow a path ~β0(t) that is a Nash
bargaining solution then. Then in general, for t′ > 0, the path
~βt′ (t) that is a Nash bargaining solution for full paths starting
from ~β0(t′) is not a truncation of ~β0(t) to t > t′. There is an
inconsistency across time. This raises many interesting issues
concerning binding commitments, what it means for a path
chosen by bargaining to be renegotiation-proof, etc.
Multiple folds will exist for the QRE surfaces involving
many kinds of game parameters, not just tax rates. Often such
parameters will be set externally, perhaps in a noisy process.
When this is the case, the QRE surface tells us how stable
player behavior is against that external noise. For example,
say the players are on the top fold of the surface in Fig. 1,
with ~β = (2, 4), so the joint behavior is near an edge of the
QRE surface. In this situation, small external noise may lead
the players to “fall off the edge”, and undergo a discontinu-
ous jump to the lower surface. Moreover, even if the players
managed to (adiababitically slowly) restore their original ra-
tionalities after such a jump, they would end up on the middle
fold of the region where βrow is near 2, not on the good fold
they started in. Due to this, when an economic situation ex-
hibits such qualitative features, it may behoove society to stay
away from such edges in the QRE surface, even if that lowers
total expected utility.
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